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THE PROSPECTIVE DEFENDANT RULE AND THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION IN NEW YORK
PAUL IvAN BizoN* AND DAVID A. GERARD**
I.

INTRODUCTION: THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

THE

privilege against self-incrimination, enshrined in the Federal Bill of
Rights1 and the constitutions of forty-eight states,2 of which New York
is one,3 is the freedom of an individual from testimonial compulsion and is
the "... . result of the long struggle between the opposing forces of the spirit
of individual liberty on the one hand and the collective power of the State on
the other." 4 So fundamental is this basic right to our accusatorial system of
justice that the Supreme Court has proscribed its abridgement by the States
as a violation of procedural due process. 5
Historically, the privilege against self-incrimination originated in medieval
England where ecclesiastical and certain royal courts, especially the notorious
Court of Star Chamber, and the Court *of High Commission in Causes
Ecclesiastical, developed an inquisitorial procedure using a device known as
the "ex officio" oath by which they would compel witnesses summoned to
swear truly.6 Once the oath was administered, the individual was bound to
testify truthfully to all questions propounded to him and the judicial body
was thereby able to freely inquire into the person's past crimes, and religious
or political beliefs. 7 Growing opposition to the abuses attendant upon the use
of the oath in criminal investigations resulted in its formal abolition along with
that of the Star Chamber and the Court of High Commission by statute.8 This
Member of the Bar-State of New York; Lecturer, School of Law, State University
of New York at Buffalo.
** Junior, School of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo.
1. "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.. . ." U.S. Const. amend. V.

2. Iowa and New Jersey are the only States whose constitutions do not embody the
privilege against self-incrimination. The former jurisdiction has held the privilege to be
required by constitutional due process. State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935 (1902).
In New Jersey, the privilege is not constitutional but is derived from common law. State
v. White, 27 N.J. 158, 142 A.2d 65 (1958). For a comprehensive collection of the constitutional and statutory provisions relating to the privilege in every American jurisdiction,
see 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2252 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
3. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6 using language similar to the Fifth Amendment, supra
note 1; see also, N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 10.
4. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 637 (1896).
5. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) overruling Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) and Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
6. 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2250; for other excellent historical expositions
of the privilege against self-incrimination, see Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction
of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1930); Maguire, Attack of the Common Lawyers on the Oath Ex Officio as Administered in the Ecclesiastical Courts in England,
Essays in History and Political Theory in Honor of Charles Howard Mcflwain (1936);
Pittman, The Colonial and ConstitutionalHistory of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
in America, 21 Va. L. Rev. 763 (1935); Silving, The Oath (pts. I, 11), 68 Yale L.J. 1329,
1527 (1959).
7. 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2250.
8. 16 Car. I, cc. 10, 11 (1641).
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English sentiment later found stimulated vitality in America as a consequence
of popular hostility to similar abuses occurring in the prerogative courts of
the colonial governors. As one scholar submits, this is perhaps "the real reason
for the American insistence that the privilege against self-incrimination be
made a constitutional privilege.... .9
The policy of the constitutional privilege was originally conceived as a safeguard to protect the accused in a criminal prosecution from being forced to
testify against himself at the witness stand' ° but was subsequently expanded to
protect against eliciting incriminatory statements from a witness testifying before a grand jury investigation or other pre-trial judicial proceeding." It has
since been extended to non-judicial investigations by law enforcement officials
and confers upon a mere suspect the inviolate right to remain silent. 12 Therefore what began simply as ". . . a prerogative of the defendant not to take the
stand in his own prosecution.. ."13 has been expanded by the courts to operate
as ". . . an option of a witness not to disclose self-incriminating knowledge in a
criminal case, and in a civil case,; and before a grand jury and legislative
committee and administrative tribunal."'1 4 Currently, the privilege has been
fastened to the right to counsel expressed in the Sixth Amendment 15 resulting
in the suppression of admissions and confessions "compelled" from a suspect
under police interrogation. The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that as a matter of constitutional policy ". . . the American system of
and that the Fifth
criminal prosecution is accusatorial, not inquisitorial,
0
Amendment privilege is its essential mainstay."'
As one observes the progression of levels in a criminal proceeding, it is
clearly discernible that judicial sensitivity to the individual's privilege against
self-incrimination becomes highly intensified as he undergoes metamorphosis
from suspect to the formally charged defendant.
II.

INVESTIGATORY STAGE

A. Pre-trialInterrogationby Non-judicial Law Enforcement Officials
The first area of consideration can be categorized as the investigatory or
pre-arraignment stage. Theoretically until at least the point of arrest, there
9. Pittman, supra note 6, at 783.
10. E.g., People v. Kelly, 24 N.Y. 74

(1861).

See Mayers, Shall We Amend the Fifth

Amendment? 187-93 (1959).
11. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). Even though the Counselnian
holding applied only to witnesses appearing before federal grand juries, the New York
Court of Appeals followed suit two years later in People ex rel. Taylor v. Forbes, 143 N.Y.

219, 38 N.E. 303 (1894) expressing formal recognition of the inclusion of grand jury wit-

nesses within the constitutional protection from testimonial compulsion. See also People
ex rel. Lewisohn v. O'Brien, 176 N.Y. 253, 68 N.E. 353 (1903).
12. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226, 205
N.E.2d 852, 257 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1965). See People v. Sanchez, 15 N.Y.2d 387, 207 N.E.2d

356, 259 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1965).
13.
14.
15.
16.

8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2251.
Ibid.
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
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are no accused at this initial phase of the proceedings. There are only suspects
or persons believed by the police to possess helpful information relevant to the
particular crimes then under investigation. The following reveals the problems
surrounding the interrogation of persons prior and subsequent to their formal
arrest.
17
1. Detention. In New York the police are expressly permitted by statute
to ".. . stop any person abroad in a public place. . . and may demand of him
his name, address and an explanation of his actions."' 8 Detention by itself does
not render one an accused since only this limited interrogation is permissible;
however responsive admissions by the detained individual are introducible
against him at the trial. 19
*2. Arrest. One is not a defendant until he has been formally charged with
the commission of a crime.20 However, a person is at least an accused if he has
been arrested, held in physical custody and interrogated. "[W]here . .. the
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun
to focus on a particular suspect ... [who] has been taken into police custody
)..,21 and is subject to interrogation, the suspect thereupon becomes the accused.
3. Police Interrogation. This proceeding is of a non-judicial character and
is primarily a law enforcement inquiry. Attendance at the interrogation is
obviously compulsory in the physical sense 2 2 -somewhat like a grand jury
subpoena which is ". . . deemed to be a form of compulsion.1 23 There is no
express statutory authority pursuant to which a law enforcement officer may
exert legal compulsion to summon a person solely for the purpose of interrogation. Nor can the police impose legal sanctions upon a witness, prisoner or
arrested individual for failure to respond to questioning.2 4
The extraction of confessions through secret, inquisitorial techniques
characterized by continuous, incommunicado interrogation has long been the
source of judicial discomfort and condemnation in the courts of New York
State2 5 and in the Supreme Court of the United States.2 6 Historically the rules
surrounding the taking of confessions and the privilege against self-incrimination
17. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 180-a. See People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d
32, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964) (The Court held that the right of the police to stop and
question an individual in the public street under circumstances that would reasonably
actuate investigation and inquiry exists independent of § 180-a, then not in force.)
18. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 180-a (1).
19. See People v. Brady, 16 N.Y.2d 186, 211 N.E.2d 815, 264 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1965).
20. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 7, 144.
21. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964).
22. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 171, 172.
23. People v. Laino, 10 N.Y.2d 161, 171, 176 N.E.2d 571, 577, 218 N.Y.S.2d 647, 655
(1961), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 374 U.S. 104 (1961).
24. See text accompanying note 12 supra and the authorities cited therein. See also
People v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 167, 204 N.E.2d 846, 256 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1965).
25. People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963);
People v. Mummiani, 258 N.Y. 394, 180 N.E.2d 94 (1932); People v. Randazzio, 194 N.Y.

147, 87 N.E. 112 (1909).
26. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503
(1963); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568
(1961); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
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have been kept distinct because of their independent origin and diverse scope of
application. 27 However, recent constitutional developments in criminal procedure
have expanded the confession rules to hold that official conduct contrived to
effectively withhold from an accused an appreciation of his rights against selfincrimination and to counsel and thereby the means to assert them falls short
of the standard of fundamental fairness required to be met by state law enforcement officials. 28 Here judicial concern focuses upon testimonial compulsion
through use of coercive investigative tactics, 20 inducements, 30 deception 3' and
the like. The courts have pronounced a tangential relationship between the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments and have held that effective denial of the right to
advice of counsel is tantamount to testimonial compulsion.8 2 Furthermore, the
language of recent opinions omits discussion of any distinction between the
confession rules and the privilege against self-incrimination. 33 Stemming from
the common law equation of voluntariness and evidentiary reliability, judicial
surveillance of interrogation conducted at this level is closely directed to a
concern for physical or psychological "compulsion" i.e., involuntariness as
distinguished from the concept of compulsion represented by the use of judicial
34
process such as the subpoena.
In spite of the fact that the suspect held under arrest" and in police custody
27. See 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2266.
28. See the authorities cited in note 12 supra.
29. E.g., Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S.
401 (1945).
30. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
31. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315
(1959); People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353, 98 N.E.2d 553 (1951).
32. One need only go back a decade and a half to find the seeds of this development
planted by Mr. Justice Jackson in a very enlightened and realistic observation in Watts
v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949):

To subject one without counsel to questioning which may and is intended to
convict him, is a real peril to individual freedom. To bring in a lawyer means a
real peril to solution of the crime, because, under our adversary system, he deems
that his sole duty is to protect his client-guilty or innocent-and that in such a
capacity he owes no duty whatever to help society solve its crime problem.
Under this conception of criminal procedure, any lawyer worth his salt will tell
the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any
circumstances.
Id. at 59 (Jackson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
33. See e.g., Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341 (1963). Perhaps the
two rules will eventually be fused into one or become coterminous in scope. Compare 8
Wigmore, op. cit.
supra note 2, § 2252, n.27 with Paulsen, The Winds of Change: Crhninal
Procedure in New York 1941-1965, 15 Buffalo L. Rev. 297, 301 (1965): "We have learned
since Stein [v. New York] that the true basis for excluding a 'coerced' confession is not
the danger of a false confession but the need to protect the defendant's privilege against
self-incrimination." (Citing Malloy v. Hogan.)
34. See Note, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Does It Exist in the Police
Station?, 5 Stan. L. Rev. 459 (1953). A good analysis of this distinction between the confession rules and the privilege can be found in Mayers, op. cit. supra note 10, at 100-08.
35. Quaere: whether a warrant of arrest is not a form of judicial compulsory process?
See People v. Santmyer, 20 AD.2d 960, 249 N.Y.S.2d 555 (4th Dep't 1964) holding that
once defendant is arrested pursuant to a lawful arrest warrant, no further testimony can be
sought or elicited; any that has been is held to be excludable.
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is obviously a prospective defendant, 36 and notwithstanding the lack of certain
procedural safeguards, 37 and also despite the fact that there is no judicial
officer 38 present at the inquiry nor any record kept of the investigation for
judicial scrutiny upon review, the courts have shown little inclination to find a
violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. Again this is undoubtedly
ascribable to the fact that the primary consideration at this level is the inhibition
and control of the use of physical or pyschological compulsion to pluck incriminating statements from the defendant's own lips and is reflective of the haunting
fear of resurrecting the ancient rack and thumbscrew.39
B. Pre-trialInterrogation by Judicial and Quasi-JudicialBodies
The second phase of the investigatory stage includes such proceedings as
the magisterial preliminary examination in felony cases, grand jury proceedings,
special grand jury investigations, coroner's inquests and proceedings before
legislative committees and administrative bodies, all of which are characterized
by the power to command sworn testimony through the issuance of compulsory
process. Such actions are formal investigations involving judicial and quasijudicial bodies.
The magisterial hearing or preliminary examination is utilized in cases
where an arrested individual is charged with the commission of a felony and
brought before a magistrate for a determination of probable cause.4 0 In essence,
it is a judicial inquiry, not a prosecution, 4' and any statements taken from the
defendant therein are done so without oath.42 Consequently, problems of selfincrimination do not normally arise in this proceeding.
At the outset it is important to note the characteristics distinguishing the
grand jury inquiry from that conducted by law enforcement agencies. The grand
36. See People v. Sanchez, 15 N.Y.2d 387, 207 N.E.2d 356, 259 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1965).
See N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 7 which defines a "defendant." A prospective defendant
therefore must be one not presently under arrest or in custody.
37. E.g., the right to be informed or advised by the police prior to any interrogation
of one's right to remain silent, People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226, 205 N.E.2d 852, 257
N.Y.S.2d 924 (1965). Here the Court of Appeals refused to extend the rule of People v.
Failla, 14 N.Y.2d 178, 199 N.E.2d 366, 250 N.Y.S.2d 267 (.1964) and its precursors
to render inadmissible inculpatory statements obtained by law enforcement
officers from a person who, taken into custody for questioning prior to his
arraignment or indictment, is not made aware of his privilege to remain silent and
of his right to a lawyer even where it appears that such person has become the

target of the investigation and stands in the shoes of an accused.
Id. at 233, 205 N.E.2d at 855, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 929. (Emphasis added.)
But cf. People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 937 (1965); People ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.2d 429 (3d Cir. 1965).

38. Note that throughout this phase of the proceedings, the District Attorney, whose
sworn duty it is to seek the truth, that is, all the evidence-even that which may favor the
defendant, has general supervisory control and direction over the procedures and methods
utilized.
39. 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2250.
40. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 190.
41. People v. Conway, 121 Misc. 620, 202 N.Y. Supp. 104 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
42. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 198. See also N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 196 which provides that the defendant may not be compelled to make a statement at all if he chooses
not to.
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jury's primary function is that of investigating criminal activity. It must be
dearly understood that as an investigative body the grand jury functions in
two distinct ways. In the vast majority of cases the grand jury will act on the
basis of an investigation already performed by others and the results of such
investigation will be presented to it. In this instance there already exists an
individual who has been formally accused of a crime. It is clear that in this
type of situation the person who has been formally accused at some earlier
stage of the proceeding and held by a magistrate for grand jury action is an
"actual defendant" and cannot be subpoenaed to give testimony.43
In the more extraordinary situation, where proof of criminal conduct is
extensive, complex and involves interwoven relationships among many persons,
the grand jury will act as a truly investigative body and conduct its own
investigation. It is in instances such as special grand jury investigations into
conspiratorial activities,4 4 gambling 4r or public corruption, 40 where there is
as yet no actual defendant, that the prospective defendant rule has emerged.
Traditionally, the grand jury inquiry is regarded as an inquest: to discharge
its function, grand jurors are empowered to compel testimony for the purpose
of a formal interrogation. Anyone summoned before this body is compelled to
47
appear by subpoena process under pain of penal sanction for noncompliance.
Once the subpoenaed individual appears, he is compelled to take the oath and
must answer all questions with complete veracity. 48 The grand jury is authorized
to engage the enforcement machinery of the courts to punish any duly summoned and sworn witness for contumacious behavior4" or perjurious testimony.50
The only way a person may frustrate the grand jury interrogation is either by
asserting his privilege against self-incrimination in response to a pertinent question or, if he occupies the exemptory status of a prospective defendant, by simply
refusing to testify at all.0 '
The critical distinction then between the grand jury and the police as
02
investigative agencies is the difference in degree and nature of "legal power" ,
to compel responses to their respective inquiries.
In contrast to investigations performed by police, the grand jury proceeding is a secret, ex parte inquisition wherein a prosecutor is always present and
43. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 250(2) permits a defendant to voluntarily appear before
the grand jury to give testimony after the execution of a waiver of immunity. But sc
Williams v. Ball, 23 Misc. 2d 78, 196 N.Y.S.2d 291 (County Ct. 1960).
44. N.Y. Pen. Law § 584.
45. N.Y. Pen. Law § 381.
46. N.Y. Pen. Law § 996.
47. Mayers, op. cit. supra note 10, at 37-38. Failure to appear constitutes criminal
contempt of court; see note 49 infra.

48. Ibid.
49. N.Y. judiciary Law § 750(a)(5); N.Y. Pen. Law § 600, reenacted as N.Y.
Revised Penal Law § 215.50, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 1030. (Effective Sept. 1, 1967.)
50. N.Y. Pen. Law § 1620(1), reenacted as N.Y. Revised Penal Law § 210.00, N.Y,
Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 1030. (Effective Sept. 1, 1967.)

51. See text accompanying notes 73-81 infra.
52. Mayers, op. cit. supra note 10, at 37-38.
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actively participates in and to a large extent controls the proceedings. Defendants or witnesses are not permitted to be accompanied by counsel in the
grand jury chambers.5 3 As if to compensate for the unilateral nature of this
stage of the action, a more exquisite degree of judicial sensitivity with respect to
the right to be free from testimonial compulsion is evidenced by the operation of
a strict exclusionary rule. The rule is applied when a witness has been compelled
to criminate himself by the use of judicial process in violation of his privilege
against self-incrimination. Where a grand jury investigation is aimed against a
particular individual in such a way that it becomes apparent that the main
objective is to extract incriminating evidence from his own lips, the court
considers that he stands in the same position as a defendant at his own trial.54
The effect of the violation of the witness' privilege is the judicial exclusion of
any testimony so compelled and a dismissal of an ensuing indictment based upon
such testimony.5 5 Stated simply this is the prospective defendant rule operative
in connection with the grand jury investigatory process. In contrast with the
law enforcement inquiry, the witness may have fully availed himself of his
right to consult with counsel prior to his appearance before the grand jury, he
may have been advised in advance of the proceeding of his privilege to refuse
to respond to questions if the answers tend to incriminate him and indeed he
may even testify without ever interposing his privilege. 56 Nevertheless the courts
will disallow any incriminating testimony elicited from him in any subsequent
prosecution resulting from that investigation. With the application of the prospective defendant rule in the grand jury phase, judicial reaction against
testimonial compulsion is conspicuously more intense than at the law enforcement level. Here the touchstone to judicial sensitivity is the concept of legal
compulsion externalized in the subpoena.
III. AccusAToRY STAGE

At the trial, where the prosecution ceases to be investigatory, but has become transformed into a highly formalized accusatory proceeding, judicial
sensitivity toward testimonial compulsion appears in its most extreme form. Not
only does the privilege of the defendant, who is now unquestionably the accused,
protect him from being called to the witness stand, 57 but the Supreme Court has
recently held that constitutional due process prohibits any comment by the
prosecutor or the judge, in the presence of the jury, regarding the failure of
53. See N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 255, which indicates which persons are permitted
to be present in the grand jury room during the investigation.
54. People v. Bermel, 71 Misc. 356, 128 N.Y. Supp. 524 (Sup. Ct. 1911).
55. People v. Gillette, 126 App. Div. 665, 111 N.Y. Supp. 133 (1st Dep't 1908).
56. It should be noted preliminarily that failure to assert one's privilege in this situation constitutes a waiver thereof in the federal courts. This rule is followed by a majority
of American jurisdictions. New York, a minority view, is committed to a policy in which
no doctrine of waiver is recognized in grand jury or ex parte proceedings. See Sobel,
Self-Incrindnation "Federalized," 31 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1, 22-25 (1964).
57. U.S. Const. amend. V.
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the defendant to take the stand.58 It is therefore at this stage where the defendant receives absolute insulation from testimonial compulsion in any form.
IV.

GRAND JURY PROCEEDING: THE ELEMENT OF COMPULSION

Though lacking crystal clarity, recent decisions have indicated that compulsion is not defined in terms of lack of voluntariness as that term has been
used in the traditional evidentiary sense, but rather that compulsion arises at
least at the point where the prospective defendant is examined by the grand
jury in relation to his own conduct pursuant to subpoena issued by that body. 9
To perhaps formulate a more perspicacious conception of compulsion, a negative
analysis at this point is necessary to crystallize the discussion.
A. Waiver
The privilege against self-incrimination can be waived by an individual at
all stages of the criminal proceeding. At the arrest stage, absent a violation of
the arrested individual's rights,60 he may voluntarily surrender any inculpatory
information to the police."' At the grand jury phase, a person voluntarily
requesting to appear and testify, 62 or a subpoenaed witness (notwithstanding
the fact that he may even be a prospective defendant) may execute a written
waiver of immunity. 63 This procedure is the exclusive means by which a prospective defendant witness may waive his privilege against self-incrimination in
New York. 64 The federal-courts and a majority of the states recognize a theory
of "implied" or "constructive" waiver, by means of which even an obvious prospective defendant who, if subpoenaed, testifies incriminatingly without timely
interposing his privilege, is deemed to have waived it.65 The reason for the
divergence between New York and the federal courts in the concept of waiver
is basically that the former deems the subpoena to be compulsion per se
whereas the latter does not. At the trial stage, a waiver is automatically effected
if the defendant voluntarily takes the witness stand.60
58. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). The Court, however, has refused to
give the Griffin rule retroactive application: Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 86 Sup.
Ct. 459 (1966).
59. People v. Laino, 10 N.Y.2d 161, 170-71, 176 N.E.2d 571, 577, 218 N.Y.S.2d 647,
655 (1961), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 374 U.S. 104 (1963).
60. See text accompanying notes 17-39 supra.
61. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 395.
62. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 250(2). Here the compulsion of the subpoena is absent.
63. N.Y. Pen. Law § 2446. It should be noted, however, that the recent case of Stevens
v. Marks, 86 S. Ct. 788 (1966) announces the right to withdraw the written waiver of a
constitutional right executed in the absence of counsel and on pain of loss of employment.
Quaere whether the prosecutor is now constitutionally required to advise the subpoenaed
prospective defendant of whom he requests a written waiver of immunity of his right to
the assistance of counsel? Cf. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
64. See People v. Laino, 10 N.Y.2d 161, 176 N.E.2d 571, 218 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1961),
appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 374 US. 104 (1963); People v. DeFeo, 308 N.Y. 595,
127 N.E.2d 592 (1955); People v. Ryan, 7 A.D.2d 198, 180 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (3d Dep't 1958),
aff'd, 6 N.Y.2d 975, 161 N.E.2d 393, 191 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1959); People v. Freistadt, 6
A.D.2d 1053, 179 N.Y.S.2d 633 (2d Dep't 1958) (per curiam).
65. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
66. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 393.
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B. Statutory Immunity

Statutory immunity should not be confused with the exclusionary rule
which is operative upon a violation of one's privilege against self-incrimination.
The former is essentially a creature of the legislatures devised to mitigate the
impact of the constitutional privilege upon the governmental need for information.67 The statutes in general provide for the "exchange" of the witness' testimony, which would otherwise be inaccessible to the governmental body because
of the privilege from testimonidl compulsion, for freedom from criminal
repercussions which might flow from the testimony if it were in fact incriminating.
Procedurally, there are two basic types of immunity statutes commonly
known as the "claim" and the "automatic" statutes. The latter becomes operative
automatically upon the witness' appearance before the grand jury or other
investigatory body pursuant to subpoena. 8 These enactments confer blanket
immunity upon all witnesses who do not execute a written waiver of immunity.
To prevent the inadvertent conferral of immunity baths upon anyone who
testifies, a second type of immunity device was drafted by legislatures and are
characterized as "claim" statutes. Under this statutory scheme, the immunity
is not triggered into operation until the witness first "claims" 'his privilege
against self-incrimination to a question propounded to him, is directed to
answer by a competent authority and subsequently testifies.69 Only after these
procedural requirements are met, does the witness have immunity"0 under these
acts.
The immunity statute presently in force in New York, section 2447 of the
Penal Law, a "claim" statute, affords a recipient complete immunity from
prosecution for all past substantive crimes that would have otherwise been
within the purview of the investigation. In other words, once section 2447
immunity is properly conferred, no indictment against the immunized witness
can issue for any substantive crime that is discoverable by direct or indirect
usage of any responsive testimony adduced by the interrogation, notwithstanding that the crime is not the immediate subject of the inquiry. 7'1
The crucial distinction between statutory immunity and the constitutional
exclusionary rule is that the former specifically excepts nonsubstantive crimes
such as perjury and bribery, which may be committed by the immunized
67. See Note, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 681 (1965).
68. Examples of this type of statute in the federal jurisdiction are discussed in Note,
72 Yale L.J. 1568 (1963). Until 1953, these types of statutes were in effect in New York
but were repealed and replaced by a "claim" statute: N.Y. Pen. Law § 2447.
69. N.Y. Pen. Law § 2447 is representative of this group of immunity statutes and
is the sole method by which a witness may receive immunity in New York.
70. People v. Laino, 10 N.Y.2d 161, 176 N.E.2d 571, 218 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1961), appeal
dismissed and cert. denied, 374 U.S. 104 (1963).
71. Comm'n of Investigation v. Lombardozzi, 7 A.D.2d 48, 54, 180 N.Y.S.2d 496, 502
(1st Dep't 1958), aff'd 5 N.Y.2d 1026, 158 N.E.2d 250, 185 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1959), cert. denied

sub nor. Castellano v. Comm'n of Investigation, 360 U.S. 930 (1959), appeal dismissed
and cert. denied sub nor. Mancuso v. Comm'n of Investigation, 361 U.S. 10 (1959).
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witness during the investigation, from its protective cloak.7 2 However, in the
case of the witness whose constitutional privilege has been violated because of
his sanctifying status as a prospective defendant, he is protected from any
indictment for either contempt or perjury, as well as any substantive crime, if
such indictment is based in any manner upon any of the testimony compelled
from him.

There remains to discuss the precise character and actual operation of
the prospective defendant as articulated by the courts in New York State.
V. TEaE PROsPEcT E DEFENDANT RULE
In unmistakably clear language, the Court of Appeals of the state of New
York has held that a prospective defendant, or one who is within the target
74
area of investigation, 73 whose attendance before a duly constituted grand jury
is compelled by subpoena and who is examined under oath by that body in
70
relation to his own conduct,7 5 with respect to which statutory immunity
77
has not been conferred and no written waiver of immunity has been executed,
is constitutionally insulated against prosecution for any substantive crime,78
perjurious testimonial assertion79 or contemptuous conduct" predicated upon
direct or indirect use 8 ' of evidence thus secured.
The exclusion of such evidence for any purpose is mandated as a result
of the offense committed upon the privilege against self-incrimination enjoyed
solely by virtue of article I, section 6 of the New York Constitution.82 This is
72. Contempt and perjury are expressly excluded from immunization in this State:
N.Y. Pen. Law § 2447.
73. People v. Steuding, 6 N.Y.2d 214, 160 N.E.2d 468, 189 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1959).
74. Although this paper concerns itself principally with the application of the prospective defendant rule in relation to grand jury investigation, the constitutional prohibition
against the use of compelled testimony recognizes no such limitation. Cf. People v. Sharp,
107 N.Y. 427, 14 N.E. 319 (1887) (State Senate Committee investigation).
75. People v. Laino, 10 N.Y.2d 161, 176 NYE.2d 571, 218 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1961), appeal
dismissed and cert. denied, 374 U.S. 104 (1963).
76. N.Y. Pen. Law § 2447.
77. N.Y. Pen. Law § 2446.
78. People v. Laino, 10 N.Y.2d 161, 176 N.E.2d 571, 218 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1961), appeal
dismissed and cert. denied, 374 U.S. 104 (1963); People v. Steuding, 6 N.Y.2d 214, 160
N.E.2d 468, 189 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1959). See People v. Freistadt, 6 A.D.2d 1053, 179 N.Y.S.2d
633 (2d Dep't 1958) (per curiam); People v. Baumer, 136 Misc. 17, 241 N.Y. Supp. 733
(Sup. Ct. 1930).
79. People v. Laino, supra note 78, at 172, 176 N.E.2d at 578, 218 N.Y.S.2d at 656;
People v. Gillette, 126 App. Div. 665, 111 N.Y. Supp. 133 (1st Dep'.t 1908); People v.
Tomasello, 48 Misc. 2d 156, 264 N.Y.S.2d 686 (Sup. Ct. 1965); People v. Bermel, 71 Misc.
356, 128 N.Y. Supp. 524 (Sup. Ct. 1911).
80. People v. Ryan, 6 N.Y.2d 975, 161 N.E.2d 393, 191 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1959), affirining
7 A.D.2d 198, 180 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (3d Dep't 1958); People v. DeFeo, 308 N.Y. 595, 127
N.E.2d 592 (1955).
81. People v. Laino, 10 N.Y.2d 161, 173, 176 N.E.2d 571, 578, 218 N.Y.S.2d 647, 657
(1961), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 374 U.S. 104 (1963). C. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
82. People v. Steuding, 6 N.Y.2d 214, 216, 160 N.E.2d 468, 469, 189 N.Y.S.2d 166, 167
(1959). Insofar as New York's prospective defendant rule refuses to recognize any form of
waiver save a written executed waiver of immunity (N.Y. Pen. Law § 2446), it is not
mandated by federal constitutional principles and is contrary to the rule applicable in the
federal courts and the vast majority of the states which deem even the prospective defendant
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not to say, that total absolution is likewise commanded. Complete immunization
is exclusively conferrable by operation of statute while the constitutionally
anchored exclusionary rule does not prohibit re-indictment by a freshly impanelled grand jury if the supporting evidence is wholly "... independent of the
evidence, links, or leads furnished by the prospective defendant ....
The articulation of the exclusionary rule thus formulated has been an
easier judicial task than its application; for the creature to which it has given
birth has proven to be of lubricous quality and eludes precise definition.
This was not always the case.
A. The Seeds of the Rule
1. Early Stages of Development
Although the interrogation of the accused at his trial in eighteenth century
New York was not a remarkable occurrence,8 4 by the middle of the nineteenth
century the common law maxim nemo tenetur prodere seipsum del accusare was
firmly rooted in connection with pre-trial interrogation by investigative bodies.8 5
Through application of an admixture of this maxim and long-honored concerns
for evidentiary reliability, there emerged the rule that sworn, testimonial confessions of the party accused produced by compulsory process during the course
of pre-trial interrogation conducted by a body possessed of judicial character
were involuntary and thus inadmissible for use as evidence upon the trial, notwithstanding the failure to assert the privilege against self-incrimination., 6
The involuntary character of such evidence was deemed to be the result of the
disturbed and agitated state of mind of one who has been charged with a crime
and compelled nonetheless by judicial oath to recount his participation in the
event.8 7 But apprehensions concerning the uncertainty of applying a rule which
rendered inadmissible declarations made under consciousness of suspicion led to
a frozen definition of the "party accused," who was soon strictly held to be
none other than one who was in custody as a prisonerunder arrest for the crime
with regard to which the inquiry addressed itself.88 One who was neither a
witness to have waived his privilege when he voluntarily testifies pursuant to subpoena and
after being fully informed and appraised of his right. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367,
370-71 (1951); Smith v. United States 337 U.S. 137 (1949); United States v. Cleary, 265
F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1959).
83. People v. Laino, 10 N.Y.2d 161, 173, 176 N.E.2d 571, 578, 218 N.Y.S.2d 647, 657
(1961), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 374 U.S. 104 (1963). Quaere whether the socalled Steuding-Laino immunity (i.e. the exclusionary rule) ". . constitutes the 'absolute
immunity against further prosecution' about which the Court spoke in Counselman v.
Hitchcock, .. .and which the Court said was necessary if the privilege were to be constitutionally supplanted." Stevens v. Marks, 86 S.Ct. 788, 794 (1966).
84. Goebel and Naughton, Law Enforcement in Colonial New York 655-59 (1944).
85. Hendrickson v. People, 10 N.Y. 13 (1854).
86. People v. McMahon, 15 N.Y. 384 (1857).
87. ". . . I hold it to be clear, that when the law rejects a disclosure made under
oath by a person charged with crime, it does so, not because any right or privilege of the
prisoner has been violated, but because it is deemed unsafe to rely upon it as evidence of
guilt." Id. at 390.
'88. People v. Mondon, 103 N.Y. 211, 8 N.E. 496 (1886); Teachout v. People, 41 N.Y.
7 (1869).
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prisoner nor under arrest but advised by the examining body that he was in
imminent danger of arrest for the crime under investigation could not claim
refuge into the sclerotically hardened lines of the class of party accused. 89 He
was, rather, a "mere witness" who was obliged to claim his privilege to achieve
constitutional protection. 90
Though the rule in its earlier developmental stages could scarcely be
characterized as extravagantly tender toward the rights of the announced but
not formally accused party, it did hold the virtue of certainty and ease of
application. 91
2. Recent Developments
The first signs of judicial willingness to decalcify the lines bounding the
class of accused persons and to expand the constitutional privilege to persons
not in custody appear in People ex rel. Hummel v. Davy 92 wherein three
members of the court, 93 reviewing a denial of a Writ of Prohibition, agreed that
the lower court should have dismissed an indictment returned against the person
who was subpoenaed and testified before a grand jury conducting an investigation directed in fact though not in form against him.0 4 Significantly, the opinion
written for the majority clings to the vestigal but gravitational pull of earlier
notions equating compulsion with
95 lack of voluntariness and holds the question
of compulsion to be one of fact.
90
In the landmark case of People v. Gillette,
the doctrinal position assumed

89. Teachout v. People, supra note 88, at 9. The fact that suspicion had expressly
focused upon one would enable him to refuse to testify on grounds of self-incrimination.
People v. Ferola, 215 N.Y. 285, 109 N.E. 500 (1915). As late as 1901, the tendency to
disregard the emerging doctrinal basis of the privilege as the ground for exclusion and revert
to the test of voluntariness is observable. People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 331, 61 N.E.
286, 308-09 (1901).
90. People v. Mondon, 103 N.Y. 211, 222, 8 N.E. 496, 500-01 (1886).
91. "Nor can the exclusion of the evidence depend on the question whether there was
any suspicion of the guilt of the witness lurking in the heart of any person, at the time the
testimony was taken. That would be the most dangerous of all tests, as well because of
the readiness with which proof of such suspicion might be procured, as of the impossibility
of refuting it." Hendrickson v. People, 10 N.Y. 13, 25 (1854).
92. 105 App. Div. 598, 608-16, 94 N.Y. Supp. 1037, 1044-50 (1st Dep't 1905), aff'd
184 N.Y. 30, 76 N.E. 732 (1906).
93. Laughlin, J., concurred in result, id. at 607-08, 94 N.Y. Supp. at 1043-44; Ingraham,
J., and O'Brien, PJ., dissented; id. at 608-16, 94 N.Y. Supp. at 1044-50.
94. During the course of a grand jury investigation into the conspiracy of persons in
unlawfully procuring the dissolution of a divorce obtained against one Dodge and the
subornation of Dodge to commit perjury for which he stood indicted, the relator, who had
been Dodge's attorney in the divorce proceeding, was subpoenaed to testify and sworn.
Before the administration of the oath, the grand jury refused to advise the relator of the
object of the investigation although he had requested them to do so declaring that he was
aware that the proceedings could be directed against himself. During the examination
however, he was informed that the investigation was to ascertain who was privy to the
commission of the perjury committed by his client. The relator asserted his privilege in
connection with certain questions but answered others. An indictment, on which his name
was inscribed as a witness, was returned against him for subornation of perjury and
conspiracy.
95. People ex rel. Hummel v. Davy, 105 App. Div. 598, 604, 94 N.Y. Supp. 1037,
1041 (1st Dep't 1905).
96. 126 App. Div. 665, 111 N.Y. Supp. 133 (1st Dep't 1908).
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by the minority in the Davey case found expression in the opinion written for
the Gillette majority, 97 and a clear delineation was made between the rights of
one called to testify as a-witness where the investigation was directed against
98
others and where the proceedings were directed against the witness himself.
Gillette was a highly positioned officer of a life insurance company doing
business in New York County. He was subpoenaed and sworn as a witness before
a grand jury conducting an investigation " '... for the purpose, among other
things, of ascertaining whether officers or employees of any description of life insurance companies ...

.'

" in New York State had violated the criminal laws of

the state.99 Noting that although the investigation was ostensibly directed
against others whose names were inscribed on a subpoena, his relationship to the
scope of the investigation was such that he was held to be one of the defendants
against whom the investigation was directed as though he had been designated
by name. Thus equating Gillette's position with that of a named defendant,
whose rights had been fixed in earlier cases,' 00 the court dismissed the indictment for the crime of perjury holding it to be a violation of the defendant's
constitutional right to have been required to attend before the grand jury and
take the oath.
In broad, bold strokes, the court disempowered the grand jury from administering the oath to one against whom an investigation was being directed
and in sweeping language, wholly unnecessary to the decision, committed to
decisional form the striking proposition that an indictment for a substantive
crime may not be predicated upon the testimony of even a "mere witness" who
has been thus subpoenaed. 10
The Gillette decision has cast a giant shadow and in its doctrinal path have
followed a progression of decisions which have consistently refused to sustain
the validity of a conviction for contempt or an indictment for any crime predicated upon the testimony of one against whom the court has found to be a
prospective defendant,' 0 2 or in the target area, though not necessarily the bull's
eye,103 of a grand jury investigation.
97. Although the Gillette case has been commonly considered as the bedrock upon
which the prospective defendant rule was constructed, People v. Laino, 10 N.Y.2d 161, 172,
176 N.E.2d 571, 578, 218 N.Y.S.2d 647, 656 (1961), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 374
U.S. 104 (1963), only two judges concurred on the ground of the opinion which called for a
dismissal of the indictment by reason of the violated privilege. Interestingly, Judge McLaughlin, who wrote for the majority in Davy and there viewed compulsion as a question
of fact also wrote the opinion in Gillette. His endeavor to distinguish the two cases is somewhat less than persuasive. People v. Gillette, supra note 96, at 668-69, 111 N.Y. Supp. at
135-36.
98. People v. Gillette, supra note 96, at 668-69, 111 N.Y. Supp. at 135-36.
99. Id. at 666, 111 N.Y. Supp. at 133.
100. See notes 86-91 and the cases cited therein.
101. People v. Gillette, 126 App. Div. 665, 669, 111 N.Y. Supp. 133, 136 (1st Dep't
1908).
102.

People v. Laino, 10 N.Y.2d

161, 176 N.E.2d 571,

218 N.Y.S.2d 647

(1961),

appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 374 U.S. 104 (1963); People v. Ryan, 6 N.Y.2d 975, 161
N.E.2d 393, 191 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1959) ; People v. Steuding, 6 N.Y.2d 214, 160 N.E.2d 468, 189
N.Y.S.2d 166 (1959); People v. DeFeo, 308 N.Y. 595, 127 N.E.2d 592 (1955).
103. People v. Laino, supra note 102.
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B. Application of the Rule
1. When Does a Person Become a Prospective Defendant?
Since the exclusionary rule is a necessary ingredient of the constitutional
privilege which has been held to be violated upon the exertion of compulsion
upon the prospective defendant in People v. Steuding'04 and since compulsion
in this context has been construed to mean attendance and examination before
the grand jury pursuant to subpoena, the status of the individual must be
identified at the time he is compelled to testify against himself, that is, at the
point in time when he appears before the grand jury pursuant to subpoena and is
examined under oath by that body. 0 5 Thus conceived, any event which occurs
subsequent to the administration of the oath and the commencement of the
examination of one who has been subpoenaed before the grand jury cannot
10°0
effect the transformation of a "mere witness" into a "prospective defendant.
Neither the enlargement of the scope of the inquiry, 07 the nature of the
questions addressed to the individual so postured, or to previously or subsequently called witnesses' 0 s nor the fact of indictment for the criminal conduct to
which the investigation was addressed' 0 9 would serve to alter the status fixed at
0
the moment at which the individual is compelled to testify against himself."
2. Can a Prospective Defendant Be "Compelled" To Testify Notwithstanding
His Status?
The marking of the examination as the point at which the prospective
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination is deemed violated by the
Steuding court represents a measured though significant departure from the
concept of compulsion as announced in Gillette. Were Gillette correct in postulating that the grand jury lacks power to administer the oath to a prospective
defendant, it would logically follow that all subsequent proceedings must be
deemed a nullity resulting in the denial to the prosecuting attorney of the opportunity to confer immunity in exchange for valued information necessary to
preserve vital societal interests in the investigation, detection, and effective
prosecution of criminal behavior. This result has been flatly rejected and it is
now clear that even a prospective defendant may be subpoenaed, sworn and,
if properly immunized from future prosecution, may be directed to answer on
104. 6 N.Y.2d 214, 160 N.E.2d 468, 189 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1959).
105. People v. Laino, 10 N.Y.2d 161, 176 N.E.2d 571, 218 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1961), appeal
dismissed and cert. denied, 374 U.S. 104 (1963); People v. Dooling, 14 Misc. 2d 907, 180
N.Y.S.2d 618 (County Ct. 1958).
106. But see Sobel, op. cit. supra note 56.
107. People v. Laino, 10 N.Y.2d 161, 176 N.E.2d 571, 218 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1961),
appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 374 U.S. 104 (1963).
108. People v. Tomasello, 48 Misc. 2d 156, 264 N.Y.S.2d 686 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
109. People ex rel. Hummel v. Davy, 105 App. Div. 598, 94 N.Y. Supp. 1037 (1st
Dep't 1905).
110. These factors may of course be crucially relevant to the determination of other
considerations.

THE PROSPECTIVE DEFENDANT RULE
pain of contempt.' 1 Likewise a prospective defendant who appears before a
grand jury pursuant to subpoena and elects to sign a waiver of immunity will
be required to respond to examination, unless he is held to have effectively
withdrawn the waiver. n 2
3. To Which Proceedings Does the Prospective Defendant Rule Apply?
As an integral component of a constitutional right, the applicability of the
rule of exclusion extends to all pre-trial interrogative proceedings where compulsory legal process has been employed." 3 The character of the proceedings is
relevant only to the question of the procedural vehicle by which the relief
contemplated by the exclusionary rule may be achieved.
4. Who Is a Prospective Defendant?
a. The Consequence Test: Attaching themselves to obiter dictum in the
Gillette case," 4 some decisions"15 and authors" i6 have cursorily and flatly
adopted the proposition that if, as a consequence of a witness' sworn testimonial
assertions given pursuant to subpoena before a grand jury, an indictment for a
substantive crime is returned by that body, a motion to dismiss the indictment
must perforce be granted. According to one view, the consequence of the indictment gives rise to the conclusive presumption that the witness was in fact a
prospective defendant when subpoenaed." T7 In this posture there can be absolutely no problem in identifying a prospective defendant in the context of the
substantive crime area. He is simply anyone who has not executed a waiver of
immunity and who has testified under oath before a grand jury pursuant to
subpoena without immunity and against whom an indictment for a crime other
than perjury and criminal contempt has been returned. But if the witness'
exemption is accomplished as a result of a presumption that he was all the time
in fact a prospective defendant, there is no sound reason for denying to him an
exemptive status for perjurious testimony or contemptuous conduct which may
have preceded the return of the indictment for the substantive crime.
Despite the attractive feature of easy workability it is suggested that the
consequence test is historically and analytically insupportable." 8 As a neces111. People v. Breslin, 306 N.Y. 294, 118 N.E.2d 108 (1954), cert. denied, 374 U.S.
1014 (1954).
112. Stevens v. Marks, 86 S. Ct. 788 (1966) distinguishing People v. Regan, 306 N.Y.
747, 117 N.E.2d 921 (1954), aff'd, 349 U.S. 58 (1955).
113. People v. Ferola, 215 N.Y. 285, 109 N.E. 500 (1915); People v. Sharp, 107 N.Y.
427, 14 N.E. 319 (1887).
114. People v. Gillette, 126 App. Div. 665, 669, 111 N.Y. Supp. 133, 135-36 (1st Dep't
1908).
115. See People v. Rauch, 140 Misc. 691, 251 N.Y. Supp. 454 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1931).
116. Sobel, op. cit. supra note 56, at 28.
117. Id. at 28.

118. Though it is true that in no recent case in New York State except People v.
Dooling, 14 Misc. 2d 907, 180 N.Y.S.2d 618 (County Ct. 1958), has an indictment for a
substantive crime (other than perjury or criminal contempt) against one who has given
testimony before the indicting grand jury ever survived a motion to dismiss, this does not
confirm either the validity or the reasoning of the test.
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sary corollary to the protections embraced by the privilege against self-incrimination, the exclusionary rule was clearly designed to operate as a bulwark against
oppressive, inquisitorial techniques designed to extract declarations of guilt from
those accused or suspected of crime. It is the containment of prosecutorial and
investigatorial abuse of the immense power to compel testimony through the
issuance of compulsory judicial process that is the essential ambition of the
rule. There is little justification for declaring as abusive those efforts by an
investigatory body to obtain valuable information from persons who cannot
reasonably be cast as suspected or accused persons at the time of the exertion
of compulsion.
The consequence test imposes a burden upon the prosecutor which the
most sensitive concern for individual rights would find difficult to hold tolerable.
Despite the absence of reasonable grounds of suspicion within the knowledge of
the prosecutor at the time of the issuance of compulsory process, the investigatory agency nevertheless risks providing effective inoculation for any substantive crime which may be detected during the course of the examination. As
none but a written waiver of the constitutional privilege is recognized in connection with the operation of the prospective defendant rule, it would obviously
behoove any witness subpoenaed before a grand jury to testify freely without
asserting his privilege and still remain secure in the knowledge that any information which he may impart to the grand jury may never be used as a predicate
for an indictment for at least a substantive crime.
b. The Prosecutorial Constructive Knowledge Test: The key to accommodating the right of one under suspicion of complicity in criminal conduct to
be free from judicial compulsion to testify against himself and the interests of
society in having its prosecutorial representative at liberty to ferret out miscreants by assembling relevant information from knowledgeable witnesses would
seem to lie with the prosecutor's awareness or consciousness of the witness'
status. Although the subjective state of the prosecutor's mind, much like consciousness of guilt on the part of the witness," 9 cannot control the question of
the witness' status, 120 it is nevertheless the prosecutor's knowledge, actual or
constructive, in advance or at the time of his exertion of compulsion which is
determinative of whether he has abused this power and thus transgressed the
12
witness' privilege. '
There are certain observable factors by which the prosecutor's knowledge of the witness' status may be objectively ascertained. The scope of the
inquiry may render a witness a possible defendant' 22 and the closer the witness'
119. Teachout v. People, 41 N.Y. 7, 11 (1869).
120. People v. DeFeo, 284 App. Div. 622, 627, 131 N.Y.S.2d 806, 812 (1st Dep't 1954),
rev'd on other grounds, 308 N.Y. 595, 127 N.E.2d 592 (1955). See People v. Freistadt, 6
A.D.2d 1053, 179 N.Y.S.2d 633 (2d Dep't 1958) (per curiam).
121. People v. DeFeo, 308 N.Y. 595, 604, 127 N.E.2d 592, 596 (1955). Cf. People v.
Riela, 7 N.Y.2d 571, 578, 166 N.E.2d 840, 844, 200 N.Y.S.2d 43, 47 (1960).
122. People v. Laino, 10 N.Y.2d 161, 176 N.E.2d 571, 218 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1961),
appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 374 U.S. 104 (1963) citing People v. DeFeo, 284 App.
Div. 622, 627, 131 N.Y.S.2d 806, 812 (1st Dep't 1954).
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calling is identified with the scope of the inquiry, the more compelling his
status as a prospective defendant will become. Once a reasonable nexus between
witness and scope of the inquiry is established, a disclosure in the minutes of
the grand jury that the examination related to the witness' own conduct and
affairs will almost invariably result in the finding that the prosecutor "must
have known in advance" that the witness was in fact a prospective defendant.
Thus, such an inquiry coupled with the following relational patterns resulted in
the finding, express or implied, of prospective defendant status: officer of an
insurance company headquartered in New York County subpoenaed by a grand
jury investigating violations committed by employees or officers of insurance
companies in New York County;

123

officer and stockholder of insurance com-

pany which was, by name, under grand jury surveillance; 124 attorneys specializing in negligence practice in Kings County called by grand jury investigating
unlawful solicitation of negligence cases and conspiracy in Kings County;125
attorney for client indicted for perjury in connection with divorce proceedings
subpoenaed by grand jury investigating subornation of client's perjury;126
"guest" at Appalachian meeting of 1957 subpoenaed to testify before investigation to determine whether any crimes have been committed or planned
at the gathering; 127 former plain clothes police officer called before grand jury
investigating bribery of plain clothes policemen; 128 employee of company selling
products to county subpoenaed to testify before grand jury investigation of
corruption of public officers in the same county; 129 co-partner and principal
vendor of tires to city called before grand jury investigating official corruption in
county, within which city is located, regarding purchase of tires without competitive bidding;13 0 insurance broker examined by grand jury investigating alleged
violations of insurance law and penal law;' 3 1 employees of contracting company
and engineering firm under contract for work on a roadway called to testify
123. People v. Gillette, 126 App. Div. 665, 111 N.Y. Supp. 133 (1st Dep't 1908). See
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) (owner of grain and commission business
called to testify before grand jury investigating violations by agents of railroad servicing
area of owner's business.)
124. People v. DeFeo, 284 App. Div. 622, 131 N.Y.S.2d 806 (1st Dep't 1954), rev'd
on other grounds, 308 N.Y. 595, 127 N.E.2d 592 (1955).
125. Matter of Grand Jury (Cioffi), 8 N.Y.2d 220, 168 N.E.2d 663, 203 N.Y.S.2d 841

(1960).

126. People ex rel. Hummel v. Davy, 105 App. Div. 598, 94 N.Y. Supp. 1037 (1st
Dep't 1905).
'127. People v. Riela, 7 N.Y.2d 571, 166 N.E.2d 840, 200 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1960). See
Comm'n of Investigation v. Lombardozzi, 7 A.D.2d 48, 180 N.Y.S.2d 496 (1st Dep't
1958), aff'd, 5 N.Y.2d 1026, 158 N.E.2d 250, 185 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1959), cert. denied sub
nom. Costellano v. Comm'n of Investigation, 360 U.S. 930 (1959), appeal dismissed and
cert. denied sub nom. Mancuso v. Comm'n of Investigation, 361 U.S. 10 (11959).
128. People v. Regan, 306 N.Y. 747, 117 N.E.2d 921 (1954), aff'd, 349 U.S. 58 (1955);
People v. Breslin, 306 N.Y.2d 294, 118 N.E.2d 108 (1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1014 (1954).
129. People v. Ryan, 6 N.Y.2d 975, 161 N.E.2d 393, 191 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1959); People
v. Steuding, 6 N.Y.2d 214, 160 N.E.2d 468, 189 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1959).
130. People v. Laino, 10 N.Y.2d 161, 176 N.E.2d 571, 218 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1961),

appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 374 U.S. 104 (1963).

131. People v. Saperstein, 2 N.Y.2d 210, 140 N.E.2d 252, 159 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1957),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 946 (1957).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
before a grand jury investigating corruption of public officials in connection
with roadway contracts; 13 2 recipient of top soil during time of construction of
expressway called to testify before grand jury investigating alleged crimes of
grand larceny in connection with same expfessway; 133 superintendent of highways subpoenaed before grand jury investigating acts of official impropriety; 134
borough president's brother who previously testified before grand jury investigating alleged bribery in brother's borough called in before grand jury and
examined relative to previous testimony; 135 possessor of stolen property subpoenaed before grand jury investigating burglary charges against others; 13 6
one of two complainants testifying before a grand jury investigating crossexamined by grand
complaints for assault;'1 37 dealer in second hand specialties
1 38
jury investigating theft of goods by dealer's employee.
Prior evidence produced at the investigation 39 including the nature of the
questions asked of earlier witnesses is highly probative of the prosecutor's
actual or constructive awareness of the defendant's role at the time of the use
of compulsory process. Less convincing but nevertheless relevant to the determination of the nature and extent of the prosecutor's advance knowledge of
the witness' true role as a prospective defendant is the nature of the evidence
adduced subsequent to the subject's attendance. 40 Least suasive because of its
presence in every case when the status of the witness is in issue, except when
he is charged with contempt or perjury, is the fact of the return of an indictment for the substantive crime with regard to which the investigation was
141
focused.
Notwithstanding the conceptual propriety of this test, serious functional
problems are at once observable. If all the circumstances surrounding the investigation must be considered in determining whether the prosecutor knew in
advance of the issuance of compulsory process that the witness was cast in the
role of the prospective defendant, can the decisional process be limited to a
review of the grand jury proceedings or must not the entirety of the investigation, including that conducted by investigators attached to the prosecutor's
office, be laid bare upon pre-trial motion? If such disclosure is required, the
prosecutor would be faced with the harsh election of providing the defendant
132.
1965).
133.
134.
135.
Luckman,
136.
137.
138.
139.

curiam).

People v. Yonkers Contracting Co., 24 A.D.2d 641, 262 N.Y.S.2d 298 (2d Dep't
People v. Tomasello, 48 Misc. 2d 156, 264 N.Y.S.2d 686 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
People v. Seaman, 174 Misc. 792, 21 N.Y.S.2d 917 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
People v. Bermel, 71 Misc. 356, 128 N.Y. Supp. 524 (Sup. Ct. 1911). See People v.
164 Misc. 230, 297 N.Y. Supp. 616 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
People v. Baumer, 136 Misc. 17, 241 N.Y. Supp. 733 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
People v. Werkes, 46 Misc. 2d 1020, 261 N.Y.S.2d 726 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
People v. Rauch, 140 Misc. 691, 251 N.Y. Supp. 454 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1931).
People v. Freistadt, 6 A.D.2d 1053, 179 N.Y.S.2d 633 (2d Dep't 1958) (per

140. "[ilt is whether the scope of the inquiry, fairly considered in the light of
all the circumstances, might involve the witness by reason of his testimony." People v.
Yonkers Contracting Co., 24 A.D.2d 641, 642, 262 N.Y.S.2d 298, 302 (2d Dep't 1965).
141. People v. Tomasello, 48 Misc. 2d 156, 157-58, 264 N.Y.S.2d 686, 688-89 (Sup. Ct.
1965).
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with an unprecedented discovery device by exposing the entirety of his evidence developed within and without the grand jury, or consenting to the dismissal of the indictment. 142 If such latitudinous review is disallowed, will not
the defendant be deprived of a judicial determination based upon all relevant
information?
From the point of view of the witness, how does he arrest the prosecution
before the stigma of indictment? 143 If all the circumstances including the
must be considered, a motion to quash
nature of the examination of the witness
44
premature.
seem
would
subpoena
the
It may be argued that if the witness can too easily determine his status
as a prospective defendant in advance of examination he is placed in the
unique position, by simply not claiming his privilege and thus keeping dormant
the immunity machinery, to frustrate an investigation by testifying falsely or
in engaging in contumacious conduct-all without the slightest risk of penalty.
On the other hand, if the certainty of his status is less well known to him prior
to examination, wisdom would presumably dictate the avoidance of all risk
by asserting his privilege and leaving to the prosecutor the opportunity to
engage the immunity statute. Of course if the prosecutor chooses not to confer
immunity, the individual's risk is not the greater since the return of any valid
upon independent evidence and as
indictment would necessarily be predicated
1 45
such could be secured in any case.
In large scale investigations involving official corruption for example it is
perfectly apparent that in order to prosecute at least some of the wrongdoers,
others will have to be given an exemptory status. In this circumstance there is
some force to the reasoning that the prosecutor should be permitted to so
position himself so as to make an intelligent choice. This would require allowing the proceedings to progress at least to the point where there is a confrontation of the witness by the prosecutor.
CONCLUSION

It is difficult to escape the fact that the very act on the part of the
prosecutor in calling a witness reflects a pre-supposition that the witness is
possessed of some knowledge or information concerning the subject of the
inquiry. This alone would seem sufficient to place the individual close enough
142. Even if made in good faith, the prosecutor's protestations that the defendant
was called before the grand jury not as a prospective or even possible defendant but
solely as an ordinary witness will avail him little if at all. People v. Tomasello, supra note
141 at 157, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 689.
143. "[Tlhese provisions of the [New York] Constitution are to protect the individual, not against a judgment or conviction, but against a criminal prosecution, except
one in which the rights secured to him by these provisions of the Constitution are respected."
Ingraham, J., dissenting in People ex rel. Hummel v. Davy, 105 App. Div. 598, 609, 94 N.Y.
Supp. 1037, 1044 (1st Dep't 1905).
144. Williams v. Ball, 23 Misc.2d 78, 196 N.Y.S.2d 291 (County Ct. 1960). But see
Sobel, op. cit. supra note 56, at 28.
145. People v. Laino, 10 N.Y.2d 161, 176 N.E.2d 571, 218 N.Y.S. 647 (1961), appeal
dismissed and cert. denied, 374 U.S. 104 (1963).
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to the subject of the investigation so as to justify his classification as a possible
defendant or at least one in the target area. By creating this classification of
protected persons, whose boundary is today as diaphanous as it once was
rigid,'146 the courts have stricken the balance between individual rights and
investigatorial necessity in favor of the former. It is submitted that the result
is sound. By calling one who is later judicially determined to be a prospective
defendant, at most the prosecutor has allowed a single fish to elude the net,
and if testimony is adduced he has received the benefit of information which
may be instrumental in successfully prosecuting others. It is the occasion when
witnesses refuse to testify without asserting their privilege against self-incrimination, thus preventing the operation of the immunity statute, and are later held
to be exempt from contempt action because of prospective defendant status
that the prosecutor has lost both the fish and the net.
Under either test uncertainty continues to plague both witness and prosecutor and each must measure the risk of his action carefully lest on the one
hand an ordinary witness find himself an actual defendant by virtue of incriminating testimony and on the other the prosecutor find his investigation
frustrated by the unwitting inoculation of a wrongdoer without the benefit of
his testimony. For all the certainty of the consequence test, it fails to affect
the case of a person who is accused of contemptuous conduct or giving perjurious
evidence. As to these areas the courts are still left to an objective determination
under the constructive knowledge test.
As it is the abuse of prosecutorial powers that the exclusionary rule attempts to keep in check, it would seem that an effective deterrent would be
the requirement that the prosecutor set forth all of the evidence which his
investigation has assembled upon the raising of the status question by the
witness either upon a motion to dismiss the indictment returned for a substantive crime or perjury or upon proceedings in contempt. With the knowledge
that the inmermost secrets of his investigation be exposed to the searing light
of the defendant's scrutiny, it is likely that the issuance of every subpoena will
be reviewed with the greatest care-thus preserving the integrity of the investigation and at the same time avoiding the violation of precious constitutional rights.
-146. See notes 87-91 supra and the accompanying text.

